

Message Text

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TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

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GENEVA FOR SALT DEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, NATO

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON
ENHANCED RADIATION WARHEADS

1. FOLLOWING IS PRESS GUIDANCE, IN FORM OF QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS, PREPARED FOR USE IN WASHINGTON FOLLOWING
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THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT THIS MORNING THAT HE WAS
DEFERRING PRODUCTION OF ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS.
ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON THIS MATERIAL
IN BACKGROUND DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
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ON-THE-RECORD RESPONSES TO PRESS QUESTIONS, BUT INSTEAD
REFER QUESTIONERS TO WASHINGTON, ON GROUNDS THAT THE
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WIRELESS FILE. TRANSCRIPT OF WHITE HOUSE PRESS CONFERENCE
ON ERW APRIL 7 WILL ALSO BE CARRIED ON THE WIRELESS FILE

2.Q.WHEN THE PRESIDENT SAYS THAT "THE ULTIMATE
DECISION REGARDING THE INCORPORATION OF ENHANCED
RADIATION FEATURES INTO OUR MODERNIZED BATTLEFIELD
WEAPONS WILL BE MADE LATER," WHAT DOES "LATER"
MEAN?

A. THERE IS NO SET TIME. RATHER, IT WILL BE
DETERMINED BY A CONTINUING ASSESSMENT BY THIS
GOVERNMENT OF THE SECOND PART OF THAT STATEMENT--
THAT THE ULTIMATE DECISION "WILL BE INFLUENCED BY
THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT
IN ITS CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMS AND
FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF THE
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3. Q. JUST WHAT DOES THE SECOND PART OF THAT
STATEMENT MEAN? WHAT SPECIFICALLY DOES THE SOVIET
UNION HAVE TO DO?

A. THAT WILL BE A MATTER FOR CONTINUING ASSESSMENT
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AND JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE OBVIOUS WAYS IN
WHICH A POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE COULD BE MEASURED,
IN TERMS OF US AND ALLIED CONCERNS. THESE CONCERNS
INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO CONTINUED SOVIET
BUILD-UP OF FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE -- ESPECIALLY
IN TANKS -- AND DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS LIKE THE
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SAYS, WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS WITH OUR
ALLIES APPROPRIATE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES TO BE
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4. Q. THEN ARE YOU ASKING THE SOVIET UNION FOR ANY
PRECISE STEP -- SAY IN TANKS OR SS-20 -- WHICH HAS
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A. NO. NOT IN THIS CONNECTION; BUT WE ARE PURSUING
CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES IN A NUMBER OF

FORUMS WHERE THE SOVIETS CAN DEMONSTRATE RESTRAINT.

5. Q. CAN YOU FORESHADOW WHAT WILL BE THE "APPROPRIATE
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A. AS THE STATEMENT SAYS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC WITH THE NATO ALLIES; BUT WE ARE ADDRESSING THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL BUILD-UP IN MBFR, AND SOME ASPECTS OF THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES DIRECTED AGAINST NATO MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO SALT III AND SO FORTH.

6. Q. YOU ARE GOING FORWARD WITH MODERNIZATION OF THE LANCE NUCLEAR WARHEAD AND THE 8" WEAPONS SYSTEMS, "LEAVING OPEN THE OPTION OF INSTALLING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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THE ENHANCED RADIATION ELEMENTS."

6A. DOES THIS MEAN ANY COST SAVINGS IF YOU DO NOT GO FORWARD WITH ER ELEMENTS?

A. NOT MUCH.

6B. HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE FOR THESE WEAPONS TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE INVENTORY?

A. ABOUT 14 MONTHS FOR LANCE, ABOUT 30 MONTHS FOR THE 8" HOWITZER.

6C. WOULD "INSTALLING THE ER ELEMENTS" REQUIRE A MAJOR ADJUSTMENT TO THE NEW WEAPONS, IF THAT WERE DECIDED UPON?

A. WE DO NOT DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

6D. WHAT DOES "MODERNIZATION" MEAN?

A. WE DO NOT DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I CAN SAY THAT MODERNIZATION MEANS REPLACING OBSOLESCEENT OR LESS EFFECTIVE WEAPONS WITH MORE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS.

6E. IS THERE A POINT AT WHICH A DECISION TO "INSTALL ER ELEMENTS" WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IN ORDER NOT TO DELAY THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MODERNIZED LANCE AND 8" WEAPON?

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A. NO. THERE IS NO TECHNICAL DEADLINE.

7. Q. THE STATEMENT SAYS THAT THE ULTIMATE DECISION ON ER PRODUCTION WILL BE "INFLUENCED" BY SOVIET ACTIONS. DOES THAT MEAN THAT THERE COULD BE OTHER FACTORS AND, IF SO, WHAT ARE THEY?

A. "THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT..." IS ONE FACTOR IN THE ULTIMATE DECISION. WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO MAKE JUDGMENTS BASED ON THE DEFENSE NEEDS OF THE ALLIANCE, AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME, AND THE COLLECTIVE VIEWS OF THE ALLIES.

8. Q. ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED WILL "FILL THE GAP" LEFT BY THE DEFERRAL OF THE ER PRODUCTION DECISION?

A. YES, AS THIS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS COUPLED WITH OTHER EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET TANK THREAT. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES ARE CONTINUING ON THIS ISSUE, AND ARE PART OF THE NATO LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM LAUNCHED AT LAST YEAR'S NATO SUMMIT. WE HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT NATO WILL BE ABLE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT.

9. Q. WHAT SPECIFIC OTHER STEPS WILL YOU TAKE TO MEET THE TANK THREAT?

A. I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ON THAT; BUT I WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT A SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY -- QUITE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TANKS -- ALREADY EXISTS IN NATO. WE HAVE BEEN IMPROVING OUR NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSE AGAINST TANKS AS THE PRIORITY WAY OF DEALING WITH THAT THREAT. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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10. Q. DOES THIS DECISION MEAN AN INCREASE IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET?

A. NO.

11. Q. IN HIS SUMMING-UP STATEMENT, DOES SECRETARY-GENERAL LUNS SPEAK FOR ALL THE ALLIES? DO ALL THE ALLIES AGREE WITH IT?

A. IN NATO PRACTICE, SUCH STATEMENTS ARE JUST WHAT THEY ARE CALLED: A SUMMING-UP OF WHAT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AT A MEETING OF NATO AMBASSADORS. I REFER YOU TO INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR VIEWS.

12. Q. WERE CONTRARY VIEWS EXPRESSED AT THE MEETING?

A. WE DO NOT COMMENT UPON THE CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES MADE AT SUCH MEETINGS. I REFER YOU TO INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR SPECIFIC VIEWS.

13. Q. THE LUNS STATEMENT SAYS THAT THE ALLIES EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR U.S. DECISION TO DEFER PRODUCTION OF ER WEAPONS. HOW SATISFIED OR CONTENT ARE THEY?

A. IN PARTICULAR CASES, I WOULD REFER YOU TO INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS. IN GENERAL, AS THE STATEMENT SAYS, "THE ALLIES UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN AND WORLD SECURITY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AND THROUGH ACTS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT AS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT." THE DECISION TO DEFER ER PRODUCTION IS AN ACT OF RESTRAINT; AND THE ALLIES AGREED THAT "FURTHER ACTION WOULD BE INFLU- LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWED RESTRAINT..." THUS THIS IS CLEARLY A CALL FOR MUTUAL RESTRAINT, RELATED SPECIFICALLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S ULTIMATE DECISION ON ER. IN ADDITION, THERE IS THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR LANCE AND THE 8' WEAPON, NOTED BY THE ALLIES -- INCLUDING THE LONG- TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM -- TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE ALLIED CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

14. Q. WHAT WOULD THE ALLIES HAVE TO BE WILLING TO DO AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE TO ACCEPT A U.S. DECISION TO GO FORWARD WITH ER PRODUCTION?

A. THERE WILL BE CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES ON THIS SUBJECT, AS THE STATEMENT INDICATES. THUS THIS MATTER COULD ONLY BE JUDGED IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING AT THE TIME.

15. Q. DOES THE LUNS STATEMENT IMPLY THAT THERE MUST BE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN ARMS CONTROL WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED U.S. FORBEARANCE

ON ER PRODUCTION?

A. THE STATEMENT MERELY SAYS THAT THE ALLIANCE "WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS APPROPRIATE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES TO BE PURSUED WITH THE SOVIET UNION." THIS IS ESTABLISHED NATO POLICY. THE RELATIONSHIP THAT IS IMPLIED IN THE STATEMENT RELATES TO THE "INFLUENCE" THAT SOVIET RESTRAINT WOULD HAVE ON "FURTHER ACTION" BY THE ALLIANCE.

16. Q. HOW DOES THE LUNS SUMMING-UP STATEMENT DIFFER FROM THE APPROACH THE ADMINISTRATION WAS FOLLOWING BEFORE THE NAC SESSION WAS CANCELLED THE WEEK OF MARCH 20?

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A. THIS IS THE ONLY APPROACH ENDORSED BY THE ALLIES. IT WAS ADOPTED WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THIS APPROACH WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE, IN PARTICULAR TO MAXIMIZE PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT IN ALL ALLIED COUNTRIES FOR MORE IMPORTANT MILITARY PROGRAMS AND EFFORTS OF THE ALLIANCE.

17. Q. WHY DID THE PRESIDENT CHANGE HIS MIND -- TWICE?

A. THE PRESIDENT'S ONE AND ONLY DECISION ON THE PRODUCTION OF ER IS CONTAINED IN HIS STATEMENT. HE TOOK THAT POSITION IN WHAT HE CONSIDERS TO BE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE.

THIS DECISION -- ALONG WITH THE EFFORTS TO BE MADE IN THE MODERNIZATION OF U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES, CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR -- WILL PROVIDE THE ALLIANCE WITH CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS IN MEETING ANY THREAT FROM THE WARSAW PACT. THE DECISION ALSO CALLS UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, AND INDICATES THAT THE ULTIMATE DECISION ON ER PRODUCTION WILL BE INFLUENCED BY SOVIET ACTION IN THAT REGARD.

18. Q. BUT ISN'T THIS POSITION INCONSISTENT WITH WHERE THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ON THIS ISSUE?

A. NO. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ASSESSING THE VALUE AND ROLE OF THE ER FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, AND HAS ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES. IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT THAT THIS APPROACH IS MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE BOTH U.S. AND ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN PRESERVING AND EXTENDING THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE.
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19. Q. WAS ALLIED REFUSAL TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO DEPLOYMENT THE REASON FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FINAL DECISION?

A. ERW HAS FROM THE OUTSET BEEN A MATTER OF JOINT U.S. AND ALLIED CONSIDERATION, SINCE IT IS A SYSTEM FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE. CERTAINLY EUROPEAN RESERVATIONS

ABOUT DEPLOYMENT WERE A FACTOR IN THE TOTAL PICTURE THE PRESIDENT HAD TO CONSIDER IN MAKING HIS DECISION. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION REFLECTS THE CONSENSUS OF THE ALLIANCE AT THIS TIME.

20. Q. BUT DIDN'T THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO THE THREE-STEP APPROACH -- OR AT LEAST WEREN'T THEY PREPARED TO DO SO? WHY DID THE U.S. HOLD UP THE NAC MEETING THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO REACH THAT DECISION?

A. WE HAVE HAD EXCELLENT COOPERATION FROM ALLIED GOVERNMENTS DURING CONSIDERATION OF ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS AT ALL STAGES OF THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. BUT IT BECAME CLEAR THAT PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR IMPORTANT NATO DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND EFFORTS WOULD BE BETTER MAINTAINED BY ADOPTING THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TODAY, WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE ALLIANCE.

21. Q. HOW COULD GOVERNMENT SOURCES TALK ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF ER FOR SO LONG, AND NOW NOT FOLLOW THROUGH WITH PRODUCTION?

A. WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT ER WEAPONS WOULD BE USEFUL IN TERMS OF ALLIED DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIET TANK THREAT. BUT IT HAS NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED INDISPENSABLE. INSTEAD, AS THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT SAYS, "WE WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH OUR ALLIES TO MODERNIZE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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AND STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR." AND A FINAL DECISION ON ER PRODUCTION HAS NOT BEEN MADE, AS REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

22. Q. DO YOU SEE EVIDENCE OF "FINLANDIZATION" IN EUROPE AS A RESULT OF THE NEUTRON BOMB AFFAIR?

A. NO.

23. Q. THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD ALLIED CRITICISM OF U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIVENESS

DURING THIS AFFAIR? DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT VIEW?

A. NO. TO BEGIN WITH, THERE HAS ONLY BEEN ONE DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT -- THE ONE ANNOUNCED TODAY. SECOND, THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE IS FIRM, AS REFLECTED IN OUR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, OUR MILITARY PROGRAMS -- INCLUDING A 3 PERCENT REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE BUDGET OUTLAYS,

TARGETTED ON NATO -- AND OUR UNSWERVING SUPPORT FOR NATO DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY. THIRD, WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK WITH OUR ALLIES TO MODERNIZE AND STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR.

24. Q. DO YOU EXPECT THIS DECISION -- AND THE WHOLE AFFAIR -- TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE NATO SUMMIT THIS MAY?

A. NO, EXCEPT IN THE SENSE THAT THEY DRAMATIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EFFORTS THAT ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY IN THE ALLIANCE, IN PARTICULAR THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PROGRAM.

25. Q. ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN THE ADMINISTRATION ON THIS APPROACH?

A. NO. THE PRESIDENT'S SENIOR ADVISERS ALL AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH.

26. Q. IS IT TRUE THAT THESE ADVISORS TURNED THE PRESIDENT AROUND?

A. NO. THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS ONE AND ONLY DECISION ON THE PRODUCTION OF ER THAT IS CONTAINED IN HIS STATEMENT.

27. Q. WAS THERE ANY DEAL BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS ISSUE?

A. NO.

28. Q. CAN THE SOVIETS VERIFY THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED, TO BE SURE THAT ER ELEMENTS ARE NOT INCLUDED?

A. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER HAD ANY DIFFICULTY VERIFYING U.S. PROGRAMS, SINCE OUR PROGRAMS ARE PURSUED IN OPEN FASHION. THE SAME APPLIES TO THESE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

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29. Q. WASN'T THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORT THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON DEFERRAL?

A. NO. IF ANYTHING, THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN STRENGTHENED THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOING FORWARD WITH ER PRODUCTION.

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30. Q. WON'T THE SOVIETS THINK OUR WILL IS WEAK BECAUSE

THE PRESIDENT BACKED DOWN ON ER PRODUCTION?

A. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT "BACK DOWN," BECAUSE NO DECISION HAD EVER BEEN REACHED OTHER THAN THE ONE ANNOUNCED TODAY. INSTEAD, THIS WAS THE CULMINATION OF MANY MONTHS OF CONTINUING ASSESSMENT OF ER IN THE U.S GOVERNMENT, AND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR SECURITY -- AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES -- IS CLEAR AND SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. -

31. Q. WHAT IF THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT RESPOND?

A. AS THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT SAYS, THE ULTIMATE DECISION ON ER PRODUCTION WILL BE "INFLUENCED BY THE

DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT..." I CANNOT GO BEYOND THAT STATEMENT.

32. Q. WOULD A SOVIET OFFER TO FOREGO PRODUCTION OF ER BE SUFFICIENT "RESTRAINT" ON ITS PART? -

A. NO. ER CLEARLY DOES NOT HAVE REAL VALUE FOR THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE IT IS ESSENTIALLY A DEFENSIVE WEAPON -- I.E. FOR USE AGAINST TANK FORMATIONS IN AN ASSAULT. THUS FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO FOREGO A WEAPON THAT HAS ONLY MARGINAL UTILITY FOR IT WOULD NOT BE SEEN HERE AS EVIDENCE OF REAL RESTRAINT. MOREOVER, WE WOULD HAVE NO WAY OF ASSURING OURSELVES THAT THE U.S.S.R. HAD NOT PRODUCED OR DEPLOYED ER.

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33. Q. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION FOR SALT? - -

A. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PURSUING A SALT AGREEMENT IN TERMS OF PRESERVING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, OF STABILIZING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE, AND OF WORKING TOWARDS REAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR

WEAPONS. THAT EFFORT STANDS ON ITS OWN MERITS, AND U.S. EFFORTS AND ATTITUDES WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY TODAY'S DECISION.

34. Q. WON'T THIS DECISION MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT
TO GET A SALT AGREEMENT THROUGH CONGRESS?

A. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SO, SINCE ANY SALT AGREEMENT
CONCLUDED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL STAND ON ITS
OWN MERITS, AND WILL FULLY MEET THE NEEDS OF U.S.
AND ALLIANCE SECURITY.

35. Q. WILL SECRETARY VANCE NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS
ON ER WHEN HE MEETS WITH GROMYKO LATER THIS MONTH?

A. NO. AS BOTH THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND THE
LUNS SUMMING-UP STATEMENT SAY, WE WILL CONTINUE TO
DISCUSS WITH OUR ALLIES APPROPRIATE ARMS CONTROL
MEASURES TO BE PURSUED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THAT
PROCESS WILL NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE SECRETARY VANCE'S
TRIP. --

VANCE

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INFO GENEVA, VIENNA, MOSCOW & STOCKHOLM DTD 08 APR 78

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GENERAL LUNS SPEAK FOR ALL THE ALLIES? DO ALL THE
ALLIES AGREE WITH IT?

A. IN NATO PRACTICE, SUCH STATEMENTS ARE JUST WHAT
THEY ARE CALLED: A SUMMING-UP OF WHAT HAS BEEN
CONSIDERED AT A MEETING OF NATO AMBASSADORS. I
REFER YOU TO INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR VIEWS.

12. Q. WERE CONTRARY VIEWS EXPRESSED AT THE MEETING?

A. WE DO NOT COMMENT UPON THE CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES
MADE AT SUCH MEETINGS. I REFER YOU TO INDIVIDUAL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR SPECIFIC VIEWS.

13. Q. THE LUNS STATEMENT SAYS THAT THE ALLIES EXPRESSED
UNDERSTANDING FOR U.S. DECISION TO DEFER PRODUCTION
OF ER WEAPONS. HOW SATISFIED OR CONTENT ARE THEY?

A. IN PARTICULAR CASES, I WOULD REFER YOU TO INDIVIDUAL
GOVERNMENTS. IN GENERAL, AS THE STATEMENT SAYS,
"THE ALLIES UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRIBUTING
TO EUROPEAN AND WORLD SECURITY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AND THROUGH ACTS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT
AS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT." THE DECISION
TO DEFER ER PRODUCTION IS AN ACT OF RESTRAINT; AND
THE ALLIES AGREED THAT "FURTHER ACTION WOULD BE INFLU-
ENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWED
RESTRAINT..." THUS THIS IS CLEARLY A CALL FOR
MUTUAL RESTRAINT, RELATED SPECIFICALLY TO THE
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PRESIDENT'S ULTIMATE DECISION ON ER. IN ADDITION,
THERE IS THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR LANCE AND THE
8' WEAPON, NOTED BY THE ALLIES -- INCLUDING THE LONG-
TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM -- TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE ALLIED
CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

14. Q. WHAT WOULD THE ALLIES HAVE TO BE WILLING TO
DO AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE TO ACCEPT A U.S.
DECISION TO GO FORWARD WITH ER PRODUCTION?

A. THERE WILL BE CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES ON THIS SUBJECT, AS THE STATEMENT INDICATES. THUS THIS MATTER COULD ONLY BE JUDGED IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING AT THE TIME.

15. Q. DOES THE LUNS STATEMENT IMPLY THAT THERE MUST BE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN ARMS CONTROL WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED U.S. FORBEARANCE

ON ER PRODUCTION?

A. THE STATEMENT MERELY SAYS THAT THE ALLIANCE "WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS APPROPRIATE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES TO BE PURSUED WITH THE SOVIET UNION." THIS IS ESTABLISHED NATO POLICY. THE RELATIONSHIP THAT IS IMPLIED IN THE STATEMENT RELATES TO THE "INFLUENCE" THAT SOVIET RESTRAINT WOULD HAVE ON "FURTHER ACTION" BY THE ALLIANCE.

16. Q. HOW DOES THE LUNS SUMMING-UP STATEMENT DIFFER FROM THE APPROACH THE ADMINISTRATION WAS FOLLOWING BEFORE THE NAC SESSION WAS CANCELLED THE WEEK OF MARCH 20?

A. THIS IS THE ONLY APPROACH ENDORSED BY THE ALLIES. IT WAS ADOPTED WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THIS APPROACH LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE, IN PARTICULAR TO MAXIMIZE PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT IN ALL ALLIED COUNTRIES FOR MORE IMPORTANT MILITARY PROGRAMS AND EFFORTS OF THE ALLIANCE.

17. Q. WHY DID THE PRESIDENT CHANGE HIS MIND -- TWICE?

A. THE PRESIDENT'S ONE AND ONLY DECISION ON THE PRODUCTION OF ER IS CONTAINED IN HIS STATEMENT. HE TOOK THAT POSITION IN WHAT HE CONSIDERS TO BE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE.

THIS DECISION -- ALONG WITH THE EFFORTS TO BE MADE IN THE MODERNIZATION OF U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES, CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR -- WILL PROVIDE THE ALLIANCE WITH CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS IN MEETING ANY THREAT FROM THE WARSAW PACT. THE DECISION ALSO CALLS UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, AND INDICATES THAT THE ULTIMATE DECISION ON ER PRODUCTION WILL BE INFLUENCED BY SOVIET ACTION IN THAT REGARD.

18. Q. BUT ISN'T THIS POSITION INCONSISTENT WITH WHERE THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ON THIS ISSUE?

A. NO. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ASSESSING THE VALUE AND ROLE OF THE ER FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, AND HAS ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES. IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT THAT THIS APPROACH IS MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE BOTH U.S. AND ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN PRESERVING AND EXTENDING THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

19. Q. WAS ALLIED REFUSAL TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO DEPLOYMENT THE REASON FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FINAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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DECISION?

A. ERW HAS FROM THE OUTSET BEEN A MATTER OF JOINT U.S. AND ALLIED CONSIDERATION, SINCE IT IS A SYSTEM FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE. CERTAINLY EUROPEAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT WERE A FACTOR IN THE TOTAL PICTURE THE PRESIDENT HAD TO CONSIDER IN MAKING HIS DECISION. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION REFLECTS THE CONSENSUS OF THE ALLIANCE AT THIS TIME.

20. Q. BUT DIDN'T THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO THE THREE-STEP APPROACH -- OR AT LEAST WEREN'T THEY PREPARED TO DO SO? WHY DID THE U.S. HOLD UP THE NAC MEETING THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO REACH THAT DECISION?

A. WE HAVE HAD EXCELLENT COOPERATION FROM ALLIED GOVERNMENTS DURING CONSIDERATION OF ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS AT ALL STAGES OF THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. BUT IT BECAME CLEAR THAT PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR IMPORTANT NATO DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND EFFORTS WOULD BE BETTER MAINTAINED BY ADOPTING THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TODAY, WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE ALLIANCE.

21. Q. HOW COULD GOVERNMENT SOURCES TALK ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF ER FOR SO LONG, AND NOW NOT FOLLOW THROUGH WITH PRODUCTION?

A. WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT ER WEAPONS WOULD BE USEFUL IN TERMS OF ALLIED DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIET TANK THREAT. BUT IT HAS NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED INDISPENSABLE. INSTEAD, AS THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT SAYS, "WE WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH OUR ALLIES TO MODERNIZE AND STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR." AND A FINAL DECISION ON ER PRODUCTION HAS NOT BEEN MADE, AS REFLECTED IN THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

22. Q. DO YOU SEE EVIDENCE OF "FINLANDIZATION" IN EUROPE AS A RESULT OF THE NEUTRON BOMB AFFAIR?

A. NO.

23. Q. THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD ALLIED CRITICISM OF U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIVENESS

DURING THIS AFFAIR? DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT VIEW?

A. NO. TO BEGIN WITH, THERE HAS ONLY BEEN ONE DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT -- THE ONE ANNOUNCED TODAY. SECOND, THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE IS FIRM, AS REFLECTED IN OUR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, OUR MILITARY PROGRAMS -- INCLUDING A 3 PERCENT REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE BUDGET OUTLAYS, TARGETTED ON NATO -- AND OUR UNSWERVING SUPPORT FOR NATO DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY. THIRD, WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK WITH OUR ALLIES TO MODERNIZE AND STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR.

24. Q. DO YOU EXPECT THIS DECISION -- AND THE WHOLE AFFAIR -- TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE NATO SUMMIT THIS MAY?

A. NO, EXCEPT IN THE SENSE THAT THEY DRAMATIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EFFORTS THAT ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY IN THE ALLIANCE, IN PARTICULAR THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM.

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25. Q. ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN THE ADMINISTRATION ON THIS APPROACH?

A. NO. THE PRESIDENT'S SENIOR ADVISERS ALL AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH.

26. Q. IS IT TRUE THAT THESE ADVISORS TURNED THE PRESIDENT AROUND?

A. NO. THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS ONE AND ONLY DECISION ON THE PRODUCTION OF ER THAT IS CONTAINED IN HIS STATEMENT.

27. Q. WAS THERE ANY DEAL BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS ISSUE?

A. NO.

28. Q. CAN THE SOVIETS VERIFY THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED, TO BE SURE THAT ER ELEMENTS ARE NOT INCLUDED?

A. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER HAD ANY DIFFICULTY VERIFYING U.S. PROGRAMS, SINCE OUR PROGRAMS ARE PURSUED IN OPEN FASHION. THE SAME APPLIES TO THESE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

29. Q. WASN'T THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORT THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON DEFERRAL?

A. NO. IF ANYTHING, THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN STRENGTHENED THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOING FORWARD WITH ER PRODUCTION.

30. Q. WON'T THE SOVIETS THINK OUR WILL IS WEAK BECAUSE

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THE PRESIDENT BACKED DOWN ON ER PRODUCTION?

A. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT "BACK DOWN," BECAUSE NO DECISION HAD EVER BEEN REACHED OTHER THAN THE ONE ANNOUNCED TODAY. INSTEAD, THIS WAS THE CULMINATION OF MANY MONTHS OF CONTINUING ASSESSMENT OF ER IN THE U.S GOVERNMENT, AND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR SECURITY -- AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES -- IS CLEAR AND SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

31. Q. WHAT IF THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT RESPOND?

A. AS THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT SAYS, THE ULTIMATE DECISION ON ER PRODUCTION WILL BE "INFLUENCED BY THE

DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT..." I CANNOT GO BEYOND THAT STATEMENT.

32. Q. WOULD A SOVIET OFFER TO FOREGO PRODUCTION OF ER BE SUFFICIENT "RESTRAINT" ON ITS PART?

A. NO. ER CLEARLY DOES NOT HAVE REAL VALUE FOR THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE IT IS ESSENTIALLY A DEFENSIVE WEAPON -- I.E. FOR USE AGAINST TANK FORMATIONS IN AN ASSAULT. THUS FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO FOREGO A WEAPON THAT HAS ONLY MARGINAL UTILITY FOR IT WOULD NOT BE SEEN HERE AS EVIDENCE OF REAL RESTRAINT. MOREOVER,

WE WOULD HAVE NO WAY OF ASSURING OURSELVES THAT THE
U.S.S.R. HAD NOT PRODUCED OR DEPLOYED ER.

33. Q. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION FOR
SALT? - -

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A. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PURSUING A SALT AGREEMENT
IN TERMS OF PRESERVING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS ALLIES, OF STABILIZING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE,
AND OF WORKING TOWARDS REAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR

WEAPONS. THAT EFFORT STANDS ON ITS OWN MERITS, AND U.S.
EFFORTS AND ATTITUDES WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY TODAY'S
DECISION.

34. Q. WON'T THIS DECISION MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT
TO GET A SALT AGREEMENT THROUGH CONGRESS?

A. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SO, SINCE ANY SALT AGREEMENT
CONCLUDED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL STAND ON ITS
OWN MERITS, AND WILL FULLY MEET THE NEEDS OF U.S.
AND ALLIANCE SECURITY.

35. Q. WILL SECRETARY VANCE NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS
ON ER WHEN HE MEETS WITH GROMYKO LATER THIS MONTH?

A. NO. AS BOTH THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND THE
LUNS SUMMING-UP STATEMENT SAY, WE WILL CONTINUE TO
DISCUSS WITH OUR ALLIES APPROPRIATE ARMS CONTROL
MEASURES TO BE PURSUED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THAT
PROCESS WILL NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE SECRETARY VANCE'S
TRIP. --

VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE

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AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
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AMEMBASSY MEXICO

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FOL STATE 090978 SENT INFO HELSINKI DUBLIN BERN APR 8, 1978
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FOL RPT STATE 090978 SENT ACTION ALL NATO CAPITALS & USNATO
INFO GENEVA, VIENNA, MOSCOW & STOCKHOLM DTD 08 APR 78

QUOTE: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 090978

GENEVA FOR SALT DEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, NATO

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON
ENHANCED RADIATION WARHEADS

1. FOLLOWING IS PRESS GUIDANCE, IN FORM OF QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS, PREPARED FOR USE IN WASHINGTON FOLLOWING
THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT THIS MORNING THAT HE WAS
DEFERRING PRODUCTION OF ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS.
ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON THIS MATERIAL
IN BACKGROUND DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
AND OTHERS. POSTS SHOULD NOT USE THIS MATERIAL FOR

ON-THE-RECORD RESPONSES TO PRESS QUESTIONS, BUT INSTEAD REFER QUESTIONERS TO WASHINGTON, ON GROUNDS THAT THE DECISION WAS MADE HERE AND DETAILED QUESTIONS ABOUT IT CAN ONLY BE ANSWERED AUTHORITATIVELY HERE. TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS CARRIED IN THE APRIL 7 WIRELESS FILE. TRANSCRIPT OF WHITE HOUSE PRESS CONFERENCE ON ERW APRIL 7 WILL ALSO BE CARRIED ON THE WIRELESS FILE

2.Q.WHEN THE PRESIDENT SAYS THAT "THE ULTIMATE DECISION REGARDING THE INCORPORATION OF ENHANCED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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RADIATION FEATURES INTO OUR MODERNIZED BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS WILL BE MADE LATER," WHAT DOES "LATER" MEAN?

A. THERE IS NO SET TIME. RATHER, IT WILL BE DETERMINED BY A CONTINUING ASSESSMENT BY THIS GOVERNMENT OF THE SECOND PART OF THAT STATEMENT-- THAT THE ULTIMATE DECISION "WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT IN ITS CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMS AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE."

3. Q. JUST WHAT DOES THE SECOND PART OF THAT STATEMENT MEAN? WHAT SPECIFICALLY DOES THE SOVIET UNION HAVE TO DO?

A. THAT WILL BE A MATTER FOR CONTINUING ASSESSMENT AND JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE OBVIOUS WAYS IN WHICH A POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE COULD BE MEASURED, IN TERMS OF US AND ALLIED CONCERNS. THESE CONCERNS INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO CONTINUED SOVIET BUILD-UP OF FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE -- ESPECIALLY IN TANKS -- AND DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS LIKE THE SS-20, TARGETTED ON EUROPE. AS THE STATEMENT SAYS, WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS WITH OUR ALLIES APPROPRIATE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES TO BE PURSUED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT AS I SAID, THE PRECISE CRITERIA FOR JUDGMENT WILL BE A MATTER OF CONTINUING ASSESSMENT AND CONSULTATIONS.

4. Q. THEN ARE YOU ASKING THE SOVIET UNION FOR ANY PRECISE STEP -- SAY IN TANKS OR SS-20 -- WHICH HAS FIGURED IN RECENT ALLIED CONSIDERATIONS? .

A. NO. NOT IN THIS CONNECTION; BUT WE ARE PURSUING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES IN A NUMBER OF

FORUMS WHERE THE SOVIETS CAN DEMONSTRATE RESTRAINT.

5. Q. CAN YOU FORESHADOW WHAT WILL BE THE "APPROPRIATE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES TO BE PURSUED WITH THE SOVIET UNION?"

A. AS THE STATEMENT SAYS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC WITH THE NATO ALLIES; BUT WE ARE ADDRESSING THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL BUILD-UP IN MBFR, AND SOME ASPECTS OF THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES DIRECTED AGAINST NATO MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO SALT III AND SO FORTH.

6. Q. YOU ARE GOING FORWARD WITH MODERNIZATION OF THE LANCE NUCLEAR WARHEAD AND THE 8" WEAPONS SYSTEMS, "LEAVING OPEN THE OPTION OF INSTALLING THE ENHANCED RADIATION ELEMENTS."

6A. DOES THIS MEAN ANY COST SAVINGS IF YOU DO NOT GO FORWARD WITH ER ELEMENTS?

A. NOT MUCH.

6B. HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE FOR THESE WEAPONS TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE INVENTORY?

A. ABOUT 14 MONTHS FOR LANCE, ABOUT 30 MONTHS FOR THE 8" HOWITZER.

6C. WOULD "INSTALLING THE ER ELEMENTS" REQUIRE A MAJOR ADJUSTMENT TO THE NEW WEAPONS, IF THAT WERE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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DECIDED UPON?

A. WE DO NOT DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

6D. WHAT DOES "MODERNIZATION" MEAN?

A. WE DO NOT DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I CAN SAY THAT MODERNIZATION MEANS REPLACING OBSOLESCENT OR LESS EFFECTIVE WEAPONS WITH MORE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS.

6E. IS THERE A POINT AT WHICH A DECISION TO "INSTALL

ER ELEMENTS" WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IN ORDER NOT TO
DELAY THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MODERNIZED LANCE AND
8" WEAPON?

A. NO. THERE IS NO TECHNICAL DEADLINE.

7. Q. THE STATEMENT SAYS THAT THE ULTIMATE DECISION
ON ER PRODUCTION WILL BE "INFLUENCED" BY SOVIET
ACTIONS. DOES THAT MEAN THAT THERE COULD BE OTHER
FACTORS AND, IF SO, WHAT ARE THEY?

A. "THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS
RESTRAINT..." IS ONE FACTOR IN THE ULTIMATE DECISION.
WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO MAKE JUDGMENTS BASED ON THE
DEFENSE NEEDS OF THE ALLIANCE, AT ANY PARTICULAR
TIME, AND THE COLLECTIVE VIEWS OF THE ALLIES.

8. Q. ARE YOU CONFIDENT THAT THE MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED WILL "FILL THE
GAP" LEFT BY THE DEFERRAL OF THE ER PRODUCTION
DECISION?

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A. YES, AS THIS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS COUPLED
WITH OTHER EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET TANK
THREAT. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES ARE
CONTINUING ON THIS ISSUE, AND ARE PART OF THE
NATO LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM LAUNCHED AT LAST
YEAR'S NATO SUMMIT. WE HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE
THAT NATO WILL BE ABLE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE
SOVIET MILITARY THREAT.

9. Q. WHAT SPECIFIC OTHER STEPS WILL YOU TAKE TO
MEET THE TANK THREAT?

A. I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ON
THAT; BUT I WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT A SIGNIFICANT
TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY -- QUITE EFFECTIVE
AGAINST TANKS -- ALREADY EXISTS IN NATO. WE HAVE
BEEN IMPROVING OUR NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSE AGAINST TANKS
AS THE PRIORITY WAY OF DEALING WITH THAT THREAT.

10. Q. DOES THIS DECISION MEAN AN INCREASE IN THE
DEFENSE BUDGET?

A. NO.

11. Q. IN HIS SUMMING-UP STATEMENT, DOES SECRETARY-
GENERAL LUNS SPEAK FOR ALL THE ALLIES? DO ALL THE
ALLIES AGREE WITH IT?

A. IN NATO PRACTICE, SUCH STATEMENTS ARE JUST WHAT THEY ARE CALLED: A SUMMING-UP OF WHAT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AT A MEETING OF NATO AMBASSADORS. I REFER YOU TO INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR VIEWS.

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A. IN PARTICULAR CASES, I WOULD REFER YOU TO INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS. IN GENERAL, AS THE STATEMENT SAYS, "THE ALLIES UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN AND WORLD SECURITY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AND THROUGH ACTS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT AS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT." THE DECISION TO DEFER ER PRODUCTION IS AN ACT OF RESTRAINT; AND THE ALLIES AGREED THAT "FURTHER ACTION WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWED RESTRAINT..." THUS THIS IS CLEARLY A CALL FOR MUTUAL RESTRAINT, RELATED SPECIFICALLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S ULTIMATE DECISION ON ER. IN ADDITION, THERE IS THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR LANCE AND THE 8' WEAPON, NOTED BY THE ALLIES -- INCLUDING THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM -- TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE ALLIED CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

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19. Q. WAS ALLIED REFUSAL TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO DEPLOYMENT THE REASON FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FINAL DECISION?

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22. Q. DO YOU SEE EVIDENCE OF "FINLANDIZATION" IN EUROPE AS A RESULT OF THE NEUTRON BOMB AFFAIR?

A. NO.

23. Q. THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD ALLIED CRITICISM OF U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIVENESS

DURING THIS AFFAIR? DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT VIEW?

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A. NO. TO BEGIN WITH, THERE HAS ONLY BEEN ONE DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT -- THE ONE ANNOUNCED TODAY. SECOND, THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE IS FIRM, AS REFLECTED IN OUR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, OUR MILITARY PROGRAMS -- INCLUDING A 3 PERCENT REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE BUDGET OUTLAYS, TARGETTED ON NATO -- AND OUR UNSWERVING SUPPORT FOR NATO DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY. THIRD, WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK WITH OUR ALLIES TO MODERNIZE AND STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR.

24. Q. DO YOU EXPECT THIS DECISION -- AND THE WHOLE AFFAIR -- TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE NATO SUMMIT THIS MAY?

A. NO, EXCEPT IN THE SENSE THAT THEY DRAMATIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EFFORTS THAT ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY IN THE ALLIANCE, IN PARTICULAR THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM.

25. Q. ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN THE ADMINISTRATION ON THIS APPROACH?

A. NO. THE PRESIDENT'S SENIOR ADVISERS ALL AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH.

26. Q. IS IT TRUE THAT THESE ADVISORS TURNED THE PRESIDENT AROUND?

A. NO. THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS ONE AND ONLY DECISION ON THE PRODUCTION OF ER THAT IS CONTAINED IN HIS STATEMENT.

27. Q. WAS THERE ANY DEAL BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS ISSUE?

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A. NO.

28. Q. CAN THE SOVIETS VERIFY THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED, TO BE SURE THAT ER ELEMENTS ARE NOT INCLUDED?

A. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER HAD ANY DIFFICULTY VERIFYING U.S. PROGRAMS, SINCE OUR PROGRAMS ARE PURSUED IN OPEN FASHION. THE SAME APPLIES TO THESE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

29. Q. WASN'T THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORT THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON DEFERRAL?

A. NO. IF ANYTHING, THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN STRENGTHENED THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOING FORWARD WITH ER PRODUCTION.

30. Q. WON'T THE SOVIETS THINK OUR WILL IS WEAK BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT BACKED DOWN ON ER PRODUCTION?

A. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT "BACK DOWN," BECAUSE NO DECISION HAD EVER BEEN REACHED OTHER THAN THE ONE ANNOUNCED TODAY. INSTEAD, THIS WAS THE CULMINATION OF MANY MONTHS OF CONTINUING ASSESSMENT OF ER IN THE U.S GOVERNMENT, AND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR SECURITY -- AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES -- IS CLEAR AND SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

31. Q. WHAT IF THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT RESPOND?

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A. AS THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT SAYS, THE ULTIMATE DECISION ON ER PRODUCTION WILL BE "INFLUENCED BY THE

DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT..." I CANNOT GO BEYOND THAT STATEMENT.

32. Q. WOULD A SOVIET OFFER TO FOREGO PRODUCTION OF ER BE SUFFICIENT "RESTRAINT" ON ITS PART?

A. NO. ER CLEARLY DOES NOT HAVE REAL VALUE FOR THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE IT IS ESSENTIALLY A DEFENSIVE WEAPON -- I.E. FOR USE AGAINST TANK FORMATIONS IN AN ASSAULT. THUS FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO FOREGO A WEAPON THAT HAS ONLY MARGINAL UTILITY FOR IT WOULD NOT BE SEEN HERE AS EVIDENCE OF REAL RESTRAINT. MOREOVER, WE WOULD HAVE NO WAY OF ASSURING OURSELVES THAT THE U.S.S.R. HAD NOT PRODUCED OR DEPLOYED ER.

33. Q. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION FOR SALT?

A. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PURSUING A SALT AGREEMENT

IN TERMS OF PRESERVING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS ALLIES, OF STABILIZING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE,
AND OF WORKING TOWARDS REAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR

WEAPONS. THAT EFFORT STANDS ON ITS OWN MERITS, AND U.S.
EFFORTS AND ATTITUDES WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY TODAY'S
DECISION.

34. Q. WON'T THIS DECISION MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT
TO GET A SALT AGREEMENT THROUGH CONGRESS?

A. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SO, SINCE ANY SALT AGREEMENT
CONCLUDED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL STAND ON ITS
OWN MERITS, AND WILL FULLY MEET THE NEEDS OF U.S.
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AND ALLIANCE SECURITY.

35. Q. WILL SECRETARY VANCE NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS
ON ER WHEN HE MEETS WITH GROMYKO LATER THIS MONTH?

A. NO. AS BOTH THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND THE
LUNS SUMMING-UP STATEMENT SAY, WE WILL CONTINUE TO
DISCUSS WITH OUR ALLIES APPROPRIATE ARMS CONTROL
MEASURES TO BE PURSUED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THAT
PROCESS WILL NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE SECRETARY VANCE'S
TRIP. VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE

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